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halacha: theory and practice
The fundamental difference between the liberal and traditional movements within Judaism is whether halacha is considered binding. There are, of course, subdivisions; the Conservative movement holds that some halacha is different from what the Orthdoox hold. But they both assert that they are halachic movements following a process.
I think one's attitude toward halacha and observance is bound up in what you believe happened at Sinai. If you think that God wrote these specific words, and specified all of the oral law that goes with them, then of course you're going to be very careful in your practice. After all, you believe that God specified all the details, and you don't want to violate God's will.
If you believe that humans wrote the Torah (either wrote it down at Sinai, or wrote it down after the fact), on the other hand, you're assuming imperfect transmission and you're going to be willing to question implementation details. And some people who question might draw non-traditional conclusions, including that this isn't really binding at all.
The body of halacha is huge. Vast. Way beyond the ability of one person to completely internalize. And so, in the halachic movements, the individual does not have the authority to interpret. If you don't know what to do in a situation you ask your rabbi. If he doesn't know he asks his, and so on up the chain until you get an answer. (Or, in the case of the Conservative movement, sometimes two or more responsa supporting different answers, one of which your rabbi will choose.)
In the Reform movement, on the other hand, the individual is invested with the authority and responsibility to make decisions. He's not forbidden from using traditional sources or methods, of course; a Reform Jew could certainly adopt the practice of taking all questions to his rabbi and following the rulings he gets, just like his traditional friends. But he doesn't have to. God gave us brains for a reason, and we're expected to use them. And since (in this view) the Torah isn't the precise word of God, there's more room for questioning and interpretation anyway.
That's the theory. And it all sounds much more tidy than it actually is. In practice, some traditional Jews interpret and some liberal Jews do not follow through on that responsibility.
No traditional Jew takes every question to his rabbi. Congregational rabbis just don't have the time, and I'd bet most Jews don't have the patience. Traditional Jews also interpret halacha. But this isn't "within the rules" of their system, so I wonder how this is justified theologically. (It's easy to justify it practically.)
Traditional Judaism isn't monolithic, either. Practice varies from community to community, rabbi to rabbi, and, as I just described, individual to individual. The common baseline is pretty-well specified; if you drive to your Orthodox shul or are seen eating at McDonald's you'll definitely draw negative attention. But there's a lot more variation in practice than it sometimes seems from the outside.
There's also a custom of bending rules. Traditional Judaism says halacha is binding, but if you can find a loophole, you might be able to do something that would seem to be forbidden. Even, it appears, if that loophole enables you to do something that pretty clearly violates the intent of the halacha.
Talking about loopholes is challenging, though. One person's loophole is another person's legitimate interpretation. I think turning your lights and heat on before Shabbat begins, rather than sitting in the dark and cold, is part of the intent; the Ka'arites called it a loophole. (Actually, they rejected the talmud entirely, but that's the best example I can come up with at the moment.)
But there are practices that seem a little more clearly leaning in the "loophole" direction. On a mailing list a couple days ago, someone talked about the practice of attending (ticketed) football games on Shabbat by sewing your ticket to your coat before Shabbat, walking in, and letting the ticket-taker tear it off. (Of course you walk there and you don't buy any food.) This, to me, is twisting the rules to achieve a result that was pretty likely forbidden in the first place.
Another example: Someone on this same mailing list described how he carries a house key on Shabbat. (He doesn't live in an eiruv.) The problem is that you can't carry things, but you can wear your clothes. So if you can make the key part of your clothing, you're ok. He was arguing, however, that just putting it on a string around your neck doesn't cut it; the key has to be either functional (in an integral way) or beautiful. You could make a beaded necklace with the key as one of the fobs hanging off of it, I guess. What he did was to modify his belt to make the key part of the buckle. He needs the key or his pants fall down. But to me, this is rules-lawyering well beyond where it should have gone. When I am in that situation, I carry the key and make no apologies. I don't pretend to be doing something else.
One more: I was once at a gathering on Shabbat and an auction was to take place. On my way out of the room, I ran into someone who asked why I wasn't staying. When I said Shabbat precluded the auction, I was told not to worry; arrangements had been made so we could bid now and pay after sundown. If the halacha is about making a financial transaction then that's legit (and I very much respect the person who told me this, so that's probably the case), but the whole point of the halacha seems to be about not doing business, and I can't reconcile bidding with "not doing business".
While I can be just as intellectually stimulated as the next guy by the fine distinctions of rules-lawyering, I don't accept these application when determining my observance patterns. Maybe that's connected with how I view revelation; I think God gave us (many) specific directives and commands, but I think we weren't supposed to lose track of the meta-issues. Those meta-issues include skipping the Steelers game, wearing actual clothing but not fake clothing, and not shopping.
I do sometimes attend activities on Shabbat (pre-paid or free) that might be questionable on Shabbat. I carry with or without an eiruv. I even ride in cars and (very rarely) drive, if it's important enough. I do not, however, do any of this with the illusion that my activities are in keeping with the traditional understanding of halacha.
I know that the Torah does not require us to be unnecessarily strict, and that adding to the law is as much an aveira (sin) as subtracting from it is. We're allowed to interpret; we can put our lights on timers rather than sit in the dark, and so on. But when have we crossed the line from reasonable accommodation into rules-lawyering to get the outcome we want? How can we tell? Within halachic movements I would expect this to be an important question, yet I don't think I've ever heard a serious discussion of it.
Personally, I am fairly observant, including some halacha that I'm not really convinced on (but community is important too). In many areas my default approach will be to do, rather than to not do; I don't have to personally research every subject. But even if my practice were 100% in compliance with that of the canonical traditional Jew (should such a person exist), I wouldn't be a traditional Jew and I wouldn't represent myself as one. That's because I followed a very different process to get there. And that process is founded in beliefs about revelation.
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(What is an eiruv?)
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An eiruv is an artificial boundary, generally around a neighborhood. One of the categories of forbidden work (melacha) on Shabbat is "carrying" -- specifically, carrying any item from the "private domain" (your house) to the "public domain" (the streeet, etc) or vice-versa. (As we've seen, you don't "carry" your clothes; you wear them.) But, the talmud asks, what is private and what is public? For example, if you have several houses that share a common courtyard, can you carry things among those houses? Can you have a common Shabbat meal in the courtyard? The resolution was that if you could enclose it, it was private -- so a fence that surrounds those houses and thus the courtyard makes the whole thing private, and there's no issue with carrying within that space.
It doesn't have to actually be a fence; an eiruv is anything that proprerly marks a boundary. There's a lot of halacha about it, and I don't know most of it, but I know that the Squirrel Hill eiruv uses a combination of fences, walls, strings, telephone lines (!), and I'm not sure what else.
As I just implied, the concept of an eiruv can be extended to an entire community. For obscure reasons, there is an upper bound of 600,000 on the size of that community. You can't have a single eiruv for all of Manhattan. There are also breadth limitations, but I don't know what they are.
For those who are concerned about carrying, an eiruv is very important. It lets you carry keys (so you can leave your house unattended). It lets people with small children push strollers. It lets people who use canes, walkers, and (mechanical) wheelchairs get around. And, yeah, it lets you carry food for a shared meal to your neighbor's house, too.
An odd bit of halacha that I think most Jews don't know is this: because this all had its origin in allowing people to carry stuff for Shabbat meals, in order to sanctify an eiruv and make it kosher, there has to be a designated challah (loaf of bread) that "starts" that theoretical communal meal. Somewhere in Squirrel Hill each week there's a challah that I can show up and demand my share of. I don't actually know where it is, though. :-)
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The upper bound of 600,000 is due to the actual definitions of public and private. According to the origianl definition, "public" wasn't public unless it was a place that more than 600,000 people were in every day (I think it comes from the number of Jews leaving Egypt). Anything between private and this really public domain fell into the laws of another sort of space.
At the same time the 'loophole' of an eruv came into being as a way to make this not-quite-public space into private space, we started considering it as more like a public space. (I can't figure out what's wrong with that sentence just now, but apologies for unclearness...).
An eruv can use, as you noted, wires (including telephone wires, as long as there's permission from the phone company), fences, and other man-made boundaries (always with the owner's permission (can you tell this was a pain for our eruv? :-). An eruv can also use certain natural boundaries, most notably extremely steep slopes.
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The number the Rabbis used as a definition of a private/public space was absurdly high for the time. At the time they wrote, there was no city in the world that had that many people in it. There's an opinion that they didn't literally mean 600,000 (or whatever the number was), but were saying the Rabbinic equivalent of "billions and billions".
a traditionalist response, part 1
I think that the key to a traditional understanding is not necessarily that God did dictate the entire Oral Law (Moshe Rabbeinu, for example, didn't understand the law taught in his name, in a very well-known story), but that the system will collapse unless that is the guiding assumption, the grundnorm. The halachic system does not make any sense without it. We need to concede that this is what all of our sources thought that they were doing -- upholding the concept of Oral Torah, and extending it rather than inventing "new law."
Now, for myself, I know that one reason I cannot agree with orthodoxy is that this kind of thinking results in too many pieties about authorship that just cannot be accepted with any kind of a critical understanding -- that Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes, or that the Song of Songs was originally written as a love poem between God and Israel. So your point about revelation (which I would characterize as the orthodox perspective, ie the general ahistorical view of Jewish law as a "text" to be read as though it was revealed in one go) is indeed a real stumbling block for me. However, I still think I can regard halacha as binding even with critical historicism, because even traditional Judaism in practice does build in all those loopholes regardless of the "text" of halacha. In addition to the distinction between d'oraita and d'rabbanan, there are so many ways that custom overrules "black-letter law." Orthodoxy doesn't admit that this is the case, but it's certainly there. So the key is motivation -- the halachic system allows for change so long as everyone is acting in good faith, as it were.
You raise a larger point, though, about the loopholes and whatnot. As someone who does believe in halacha, I have a few things to say. First, some of what you mention is folk practice that is clearly not halachic. You cannot carry a key in your shoelace or pinned to your shirt -- this is cut and dried. Even making it an ornament would not be accepted by many poskim, and I think it does have to be seen as a dodge. You're right that by carrying outright in that context, you're being more honest about what's happening than they are.
However, there are other things in which a broader point is at stake. An eruv itself, or an auction on shabbat, or selling your chametz to a non-Jew for the duration of passover, or a prosbul, are all good examples of what we might call a "legal fiction." These are things that seem to clearly violate "black-letter law" but only are permitted because of a fairly casuistic reading of the law. They violate what was almost certainly the original intent of the law but allows people to think they're being observant by maintaining it.
Here you raise something other than the issue of revelation per se for your argument: what is "the whole point of the halacha," after all? I think that's really the crux of the argument between Reform and traditionalism. And I don't mean to equate Reform with Christianity at all, but I clearly think that the idea of "the spirit of the law" is where Christianity comes from. When Jesus says that stuff about straining out a gnat but being morally blind to the meaning of the law, that's what he means. And I think honestly that he had a point, and that Christianity does have a point about Jewish casuistry that way.
(...to be continued, because my comment is too long...)
a traditionalist response, part 2
But the reason I am a traditionalist is that I think there is only one good response to that kind of point: that on some level, we do not really understand "the whole point of the halacha," as human beings. If we begin to look at how this system really makes us better people, the system will collapse. There are plenty of Christians who are wonderful human beings and yet manage to do so without worrying about the myriad insane details of everyday life that observant Jews do. If we were to judge halacha purely on the basis of it making us a better person in a moral or ethical or spiritual way, it would fall short. Putting aside chametz or treif might make me a better Jew, and it might make me a better person, but I don't think that it's been proven to make people in general more moral or ethical than other systems.
(...to be continued, because my comment is too long)
So if running around not eating leaven on pesach, or whatever, really matters to God, I think it would not be for reasons that we can fully comprehend as human beings. And to me that dictates a certain humility about how well I as an individual can know "the point of the halacha." Human beings can only do that imperfectly; the best we can do is, as a community, to decide what that point really is.
So custom is really a crucial aspect of understanding revelation. There's a great story in Avot de Rabbi Natan about a someone asking Hillel why we follow the Oral Law. Hillel asks them to recite the alef-bet, then tells them that what they think is alef is really bet, what they think is bet is really lamed, and so on. Of course this isn't true: the point is, how we know what we know to begin with -- from the alef-bet on up -- is from being taught the patterns to begin with. And that same institutional frame (ultimately, Oral Law in its broadest sense) that taught you the alef-bet is essential for understanding the meaning of what you learn. You can't know the "spirit of the law" without being in a system to begin with that presumes you buying in to its assumptions.
And one thing that follows is that while fences around the law can protect it, it's hard to say what is or is not in the spirit of the law. A practice (such as the auction, which was done for many hundreds of years in shul on Shabbat as the way to decide who got aliyas!) that is within the law but seems to go against its spirit can thus be permitted via the halachic process.
So to answer your last point, this is a very critical issue for the traditional movements (and orthodoxy sooner or later faces everything that Conservatives do). Right now the Conservative movement is embroiled in an argument over homosexuality. The key, though, is that the Bible doesn't mention "homosexuality." It mentions one specific act. It's unclear to me whether the "spirit of the law" would dictate that homosexuals are an abomination, or whether we would look at the broader "spirit of the law" to say that we are taught to love one another, etc., and that this shouldn't apply. In other words, "the spirit of the law" or "the point of the halacha" are issues that don't really settle why we do what we do. They can't really answer the inscrutable fact that this thing is in the Torah.
I say all this as someone who is also not completely halachically observant, but I think that people who live in a traditional context really do think about these things all the time. The problem of authority, as you say, is present for everyone. In my case, I don't always trust my rabbi to be a true authority for the community -- I increasingly find myself following "Rav Scroll." :-) But the key is that I have learned to not always trust that my own, lay understanding of the law, given that I am someone who knows very little of the underlying logic of the system. At the end of the day, a rabbi, and not me, is a better authority.
Hey, can I post some of this discussion on
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Thanks! Lots to digest here.
Hey, can I post some of this discussion on ocons_judaism?
Feel free. You might want to include a link back to this entry too, in case people want to see broader context or whatever.
Re: a traditionalist response, part 2
The idea that halacha (as it comes to us today) isn't necessarily what God dictated but may as well be is intriguing. I have at times said similar things about the revelation at Sinai -- that even if it didn't happen, it is so bound up in who we are that we should proceed as if it did. I've said this in reference to the written Torah, though, not the oral. While it's circular reasoning, we have "documentation" (that is, the Torah itself) for the Torah being given there. We don't have primary documentataion for the oral law accompanying it; we only have hints. Is there a stronger case for it than the assertion at the beginning of Pirke Avot -- that God transmitted it to Moshe, who transmitted it to Yehoshua, who transmitted it to the prophets, who transmitted it to the men of the Great Assembly?
As for when how much of Torah was revealed, I'm actually fuzzier on that then you give me credit for. :-) Basically, I believe that God did have a conversation (if we can use such a mundane word) with Moshe, who wrote it down during and after. I give more weight to things that are repeated; for example, it seems really, really obvious that God cares about making Shabbat different from the other days. I am not concerned about implications of minor spelling or word-choice issues, gemmatria, etc. And I hand-wave mightily around the who D'varim (Deuteronomy, in case anyone else is still reading this) question, because I really don't believe that Moshe wrote an account of his own death.
But I absolutely believe that something happened at Sinai between God and b'nei Yisrael. If I didn't, halacha would just be interesting quirky traditions of an adopted people (not even my own family), and what does that mean? (I think a lot of Reform Jews don't believe in the Sinai encounter, and this is part of why so many of them do only the fun family-oriented rituals and not the rest of halacha.)
As for the "whole point of the halacha", I elided an important distinction. While I will hear all opinions, I give the Torah more weight than I give oral law. So, for example, I don't know, or need to know, what God has against eating pigs; it's clearly stated as a problem in Torah, and I'm convinced it's important. On the other hand (to continue with a food example), the Torah doesn't say anything about separate dishes and waiting periods, so when examining the halacha on this I sometimes ask myself "is this really in keeping with what appears to be the intent?". That is, derivative opinions have to show their work.
(That said, I do actually keep separate dishes, including for Pesach, and observe waiting periods. Part of it is that I'd like to be able to cook for certain friends, and part of it is that I have found new meaning with which to invest these practices. I find that it is very powerful to have to think about the source of my food and well-being every time I shop, prepare, and serve a meal. So while, halachically, I could solve the dishes dilemma by maintaining a supply of disposable tins, plates, etc, and thus never thinking about meat vs. dairy when setting the table, that would actually diminish things for me. Um, I think I'm not explaining this very well.)
[to be continued]
Re: a traditionalist response, part 2
It's interesting: notice that that passage doesn't say "Oral Torah" or even "the Torah," it just says "Torah was received by Moses etc..." In other words, if this is a chain of revelation, it's not very clear. Neusner has a good point about this: the amazing thing about the Mishna is that it's very radical -- Pirke Avot aside (and that's not even technically part of the Mishna), it makes no attempt to justify its rulings.
As a historian, I personally am also quite "fuzzy" about revelation and I am committed to a historicist view of these things, which is to say that, yes, something happened at Sinai, and then after that we have the residue of a thousand years of evolving institutions in both the Written and Oral Law.
But, my point is that I think that Judaism as a post-70 CE phenomenon is incomprehensible without the Mishna, and the Mishna, as I said, is very radical and audacious. It basically says, accept this, or don't -- it doesn't even really say why to accept it. That erases all that stuff that's in the written Torah that is fodder for critical historicism (like the fact that there are 2 accounts of Noah's ark). It's presenting rabbinic Judaism as a single thing to subscribe to or not; if you don't subscribe to it, you're left with just the letter of the written Torah itself -- Sadduceeism. In this respect, what's in a text like the Torah (or the Mishna) is less important than the idea that there is such a thing as Oral Law that has an authority from God.
I think that in that way it leads me (as a traditionalist) to an opposite conclusion from what you discuss about original intent and things that are in keeping with whatever the original intent was. As a historian, I feel pretty confident that the "original intent" of the prohibition on pig was some kind of tribal custom based on an ancestral taboo. But if I really believed that that was what Judaism meant, it would be meaningless to me. So that's why on some level I think Oral Law is important. It's a way to mediate the practices of a bunch of desert tribesmen with the realities of today. It gives us license to think about the meaning behind these things -- even as it then puts up limits to how far those meanings can go.
I wonder if I haven't reasoned myself into a circle, a bit, but I wanted to explain why Oral Law strikes me as more liberating than constricting, in the grand scheme of things... perhaps I'll write more when I'm in a more coherent state of mind.
Re: a traditionalist response, part 2
I don't believe the point of halacha is to make us better people. The point of the entire covenant is that God has certain requirements of us, in exchange for which we get a certain kind of relationship with God. I've got a post coming later on chosenness, and I'll say more about this there. But, while being good, ethical people is certainly part of what's expected of us, it's not everything.
But, all that said, I take your point that we can't always know the point, and that it's arrogant to try. But I think we can sometimes do better than we do, and that it's also wrong to just say "I don't care; the (interpreted) law is such-and-such and that's good enough".
At the end of the day, a rabbi, and not me, is a better authority.
I treat rabbis pretty much the way I treat doctors. 99.9% of the time I'm going to do what my rabbi tells me to do, because he is an expert and I am not. If it's an issue I don't feel strongly about it, I ask, he answers, and we're done. If it's a more important issue to me and we have a disagreement, I will ask him to explore it with me, to show me the reasoning, to explain alternate views, and so on. And then I will make an informed decision. (In point of fact I have never done something against my rabbi's advice -- but it could happen.)
I take "make for yourself a rav" pretty seriously.
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I'm not sure where you got that impression. If one *knows* the basic rules and/or knows where to look, one can certainly poskin for oneself. The advantage to asking a rabbi is that if the answer is wrong, it's *his* responsibility, and that he's recieved extensive training in the most common and important areas - Shabbat, kashrut and tahara hamishpochah, so he's more likely to know the answer. Jonathan and I ask relatively few questions, but when we do ask, they're pretty major.
Although, part of that is that we spent eleven years where we didn't get along well with our local rabbi, and so felt uncomfortable asking anything. We get along fine with our current one, but we never got in the habit of asking.
I do use Shabbat keys, in a belt of my own devising - the keys form links in a chain of keyrings. Wearing clothing is obviously permitted, and jewelry is also permitted, so Shabbos keys made into pins or tie clips, or Shabbos belts with the buckle tongues replaced by keys all work. However, there are Orthodox rabbis who agree with you - if you only wear the belt or pin or tie clip on Shabbat, then it's not to wear it for wearing's sake, but for carrying's sake.
Therefore, in Flatbush, where there is, imho, a perfectly acceptable eruv but one that a lot of people don't hold by, many folks have "Shabbos locks" - a combination lock so that no key need be carried at all. They use normal keylocks on weekdays. Even though I hold by the eruv, and therefore carry prayerbooks or whatever, I prefer to limit my carrying. I also use the belt on Yom Tov, when carrying is permitted.
The law has a letter and a spirit - and those who only do one aren't doing it right, imho. Given a choice, I'd go for the letter, because then you're not doing things wrong. Of course, I *do* believe in Divine Revelation.
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On asking: from watching and talking with ordinary people, mostly. Maybe my sample set is flawed?
On interpretation: that I'm more sure of. I've definitely seen serious Orthodox Jews doing things that are conventionally held to be violations of halacha. (For example, touching people of the opposite sex.) They aren't apostates who don't care, so they must have reasons. Usually it's impolite to ask, however. (I don't want an innocent question to be mistaken for chastisement.) One time I did ask and got the answer that the person disagreed with the conventional understanding.
So I just assumed this sort of thing was normal.
And, do most/all extra stringencies come from rabbinic rulings, or do most people who take them on do so individually? (Glatt kosher, not using a perfectly functional eiruv, shaving the head rather than covering hair as a matter of halacha rather than convenience, two sets of t'fillin (conventional and Rabbenu Tam)...)
I agree that you need to pay attention to both letter and spirit. If forced to choose I would choose spirit, but that's because I believe differently about revelation.
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The question is more, is it a custom or a law? I'm not sure, but "negiah" may well be a custom, and so, while minhagim are supposed to be binding, if someone disagrees, he's not violating anything.
And, yes, it does happen a lot that someone looks at a custom and decides that the conventional understanding of the underlying law is wrong. And he or she can usually find sources to back him or her up. But. They have to be certain that it is only a custom.
From what I can see, most chumrot (stringencies in customs) come from ignorance or zealotry, or even a fear of asking questions. Shaving the head, btw, is not considered halacha anywhere. Even those groups who do so regard it as a binding custom, and understand it's for convenience. Binding customs have the almost the force of law - why I don't eat peas during Pesach, for example - but they are not laws.
Glatt kosher, btw, is not a stringency. Like many halachot, there are three stances possible - leniencies, "stam" and stringencies. For Ashkenazi Jews, there is a leniency that permits non-glatt meat, so for them it's kosher. For S'phardi Jews, no such leniency exists, and they must eat glatt - and Ashkenazi glatt isn't strict enough for them.
And I'm not even sure what the term for using two sets of t'filin is, other than the custom of Lubavitch.
The chances are, if someone asked about something, their rabbi is more likely to give a more lenient answer than they would themselves - example. I accidentally used a plastic meat spatula in a pareve soup made in a dairy pot. If left to my own devices, I'd have discarded the soup and the spatula. But. I called my rabbi. Pot is kosher. Soup is kosher, but should be served in pareve or disposable bowls. Spatula is kosher. (Another rabbi we asked after receiving and acting on this p'sok was a bit stricter, but we were already covered.)
There is also a thing in the more right wing groups to be "frummer than thou" - the more stringencies the better. It's a form of zealotry that makes an already fragmented group even more fragmented, imho.
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Take revelation at Sinai. The Reform and Conservative movements don't believe that God gave the entire Torah (written and oral) to Moses at Mt. Sinai. The "Orthodox" do. But the Torah itself doesn't seem to indicate that the entire written Torah was given at Sinai, and, in fact, traditional commentators such as Rashi didn't think so either. They thought that some of the Torah was given at Sinai, and took the position that all of it had been given to Moses by God, but over the course of 40 years...
One thing that I find discouraging when I look (as an outsider) at the Orthodox world is the way that it seems that the movement is swinging to become more strict. There are often cases where there are more and less lenient positions, and it seems that people are choosing to always follow the more strict interpretation. And with the shrinking of the world (and the destruction and displacement of the Jews of Europe), in more and more ways traditional practice is getting stricter and more homogeneous. It doesn't help that there are organizations which present their interpretations of halacha as the way. If it's printed, people will follow it... especially if it's printed in a way which doesn't present other possibilities. People used to learn how to be Jewish from their families; now they learn from Reb. Artscroll. Reb. Artscroll has good stuff to say, but he's just one voice. (Well, OK, there is no "Reb. Artscroll", but their publications do have a fairly cohesive point of view.)
OK, enough rambling from me for now.
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Just to be safe. If you take on an unnecessary stringency that's ok, but if you err in a lenient one you could be guilty of sin.
Except that we are also told not to add to the law, and as imperfect humans we're going to err anyway. So while we shouldn't use the latter as an excuse to be sloppy, an honestly-derived leniency should be an acceptable position. But for some reason it often isn't.
We are seeing acretions to halacha in a manner that's probably not dissimilar to the acretions to the liturgy that have occurred over the last millenium. We publication comes uniformity, and it's always easier to handle a difference of opinion by taking the stricter view (or, in the case of liturgy, including everything) than by actually resolving the question. Except that you run the risk of people getting driven away when it gets to be too much.
It doesn't look like people are leaving Orthodoxy in droves, so I guess the system works well for them.