daf bit: Nazir 62

[cellio]

As we near the end of tractate Nazir, the discussion turns to slaves. Can a slave make a nazarite vow? Yes, and not only that but, according to the mishna, the nazarite vow of a slave is more stringent than one of a woman, because a man can annul his wife's vow but cannot annul his slave's vow. If a slave's master disapproves of the slave's vow, it appears that the master's only recourse is to free the slave. (62b)

(I assume, though I couldn't confirm one way or the other in the Aramaic text, that this is talking about an eved ivri, a Jewish slave. Jewish slaves get freed eventually anyway, so this would just mean accelerating the schedule, and I would be surprised if non-Jews can (per torah) take nazarite vows. (Of course they can vow anything they like, but it wouldn't be governed by torah, I would think.)

Comments

[zevabe.livejournal.com]

The default slave is actually a canaanite slave.

A Hebrew slave has all of the laws of a regular unenslaved Hebrew, other than that he is not allowed to quit. A non-Jewish slave has partially converted, and is obligated in all mitzvot except positive time bound mitzvot (hence the frequent comparison to women*).

Presumably, a slave who vowed to become a Nazirite and was freed would stay a Nazirite. However, the objecting master would not then own a nazirite slave. This could be useful if for example the master liked serving foods with wine sauces. Since he must feed the slave, and the slave will not eat wine-flavored foods (unsure about absorbed wine in dishes), the master must either make other food or set him free.

* There are certain rabbinic mitzvot which women are included in because they were included in the miracle which created that mitzva. For example: 4 cups and maror on Pesach, 3 meals on Shabbat, Megillat Ester, etc. I am unsure if slaves are also obligated in these things because women are, or if they are excluded because they were not included in miracles of Pesach, manna, or Purim respectively.

[cellio]

Thanks! I didn't know all that.

Presumably, a slave who vowed to become a Nazirite and was freed would stay a Nazirite.

The mishna says that explicitly here.

Since he must feed the slave, and the slave will not eat wine-flavored foods (unsure about absorbed wine in dishes), the master must either make other food or set him free.

How does the obligation to provide food interact with voluntary choices on the part of the slave (whether that's becoming a nazarite, becoming a vegan, or deciding on an all-prime-rib diet)?

[zevabe.livejournal.com]

I believe the latter point (a creative slave vowing himself into better food or such) is the reason that a) a man can annul his wife's vows b) the slave is considered more stringent.

The master has to provide food which is objectively of equal (or better) quality with his own. A simple preference may not be neccesarily honored.

I assume that if it were a vow, the master would have to respect it, or free him. Of course, then the slave would be stuck eating only whatever he vowed. A slave might be able to vow not to eat anything but steak and sherry as long as he is a slave, I suppose. Such a clever slave is presumed to be cagey enough to be a full-fledged Jew. ;-)

[cellio]

A simple preference may not be neccesarily honored.
I assume that if it were a vow, the master would have to respect it, or free him.

See, that's the thing -- taking the nazarite vow is also a preference. How is being indirectly compelled by a preference (the vow) different from being directly compelled by one (the prime-rib diet)? There are, so far as I know, no circumstances under which one is required to take a nazarite vow, and vows in general are discouraged.

[zevabe.livejournal.com]

By preference I meant an expressed preference without the strength of a vow. A modern vegetarian for example, has likely not taken a vow that all meat should be prohibited to them like the meat of sacrifices.

Take for example my roommate from college. He is a vegetarian. However, while on Parris Island (Marine corps boot camp) he ate meat. He would not have starved to death by not eating the meat, but he would not have recieved other food to replace it. So he chose to eat the meat. Had it been a vow, he would have needed to find a beit din to attempt to do hatarat nedarim (nullification of vows), at which point the beit din may or may not have allowed him to eat meat.