cellio: (talmud)
[personal profile] cellio
The talmud has previously talked about compensation that is due if your animal damages another, distinguishing between those that are known to be damaging (the ox that gores, mu'ad) and those that are not (tam). On today's daf the mishna talks about relationships between the owners. If a privately-owned ox gores an ox consecrated to the temple, or vice-versa, there is no liability, because it says "the ox of his neighbor" -- the temple is not "his neighbor". If an ox belonging to an Israelite gores one belonging to a Cana'anite there is no liability, but if an ox belonging to a Cana'anite gores one belonging to an Israelite, full compensation is due. (37b)

I don't see an explanation here about the asymmetry between the Israelite and the Cana'anite. According to a note in the Soncino edition, Maimonides, centuries later, explains: Cana'anites did not recognize the laws of social justics, and they were thus not entitled to claim protection under a law they did not respect. They could, however, be held liable under Israel's laws for damage they do to Israelites. That doesn't explain, however, why full compensation is due from the Cana'anite regardless of whether the ox is mu'ad or tam; an Israelite would owe another Israelite half damages in the latter case.

(no subject)

Date: 2016-07-15 07:56 am (UTC)
From: [identity profile] eub.livejournal.com
but it's a person, not an institution

Seems coherent as a distinction to draw.

Now I'm thinking about the idea of the "nonporous corporation", the idea that a piece of property can be owned by an institution and the ownership doesn't go on transitively to any person, it stops there with the institution being a root owner. Was corporate personhood in the legal system? I'd learn something surprising!

Though... it occurs to me that the temple oxen may not be a case of general corporate ownership at all, but specifically a case of divine ownership. Reparation given to God would be inappropriate.

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