cellio: (talmud)

An idolater can annul an idol belonging to himself or to another idolater, the mishna says, but an Israelite cannot annul an idol belonging to an idolater. How does he annul it? If he cut off the tip of its ear, nose, or finger, or if he defaced it, then even if no material was lost (nothing was broken off), it is annulled. But if he spat before it, urinated before it, dragged it in the dust, or hurled excrement at it, it is not annulled. If he sold or gave it as a pledge, Rabbi says he has annulled it but the sages say he hasn't. (52b-53a)

The forms of annulling that work involve permanent changes to the idol, so it makes sense to me that they would make it no longer suitable as an idol. An implication of that reasoning is that idols can't be repaired; I don't know if the rabbis actually say that somewhere. (Not here.) The second list are all things we consider disrespectful but that don't physically alter the idol; apparently any spiritual damage they do is not permanent. Also, we're told elsewhere that some idols are actually properly worshipped with human waste. (I am not making this up.) So there's that.

cellio: (talmud)

Procolos, the son of a philosopher, found R' Gamaliel bathing in the bath of Aphrodite in Acco, and asked him: It is written in your torah, there shall cleave nought of the devoted thing [of other gods] to your hand (Deut 13:18), so why are you bathing in the bath of Aphrodite? He responded: we may not answer questions of torah in a bath. When he came out, he said: I did not come into her domain but she came into mine. Nobody says the bath was made as an adornment for Aphrodite; rather they say that Aphrodite was made as an adornment for the bath. (In other words, the bath existed first, and then somebody put up the statue.) That's from the mishna.

In the g'mara Abaye says of this last part: so what? Even if the statue had been there first there wouldn't be a problem! For we have learned: if an idol has a bath-house or a garden, we may use it so long as it is not to the advantage of idolatry (there is no payment or recognition of any kind required in order to use it). Abaye then answers his challenge, saying that R' Gamaliel's argument was sound: since he was so eminent, his mere use of a bath dedicated to an idol would be seen as an honor, and thus recognition, by the heathens, and therefore he needs to distinguish between a bath that had a statue added and a idol that had a bath built for it. (44b)

Today's daf is 45.

cellio: (talmud)

Last week we talked about restrictions on wine when heathens are involved. This week the talmud discusses (over several pages) other articles that, if they come from heathens, are prohibited to Jews but we can benefit from them in other ways (like selling them). They include:

  • Milk which a heathen milked without an Israelite being present, because we are concerned that milk from non-kosher animals could be mixed in.

  • Their bread and oil (but Rabbi permitted oil). This appears to be to impede intermingling that could lead to intermarriages. (Remember that bread is a staple of meals.)

  • Stewed and preserved foods that are customarily made with wine (presumably because you can't really tell).

  • Pickled minced herring, because you can't clearly identify the fish as a kosher species when it's minced.

However, a Jew may consume milk milked by a heathen if an Israelite supervised, pickled herring that wasn't minced (so you can identify the fish), and even preserved foods that they don't customarily make with wine. (35b-39b)

With the exception of the bread and oil, these restrictions are all about uncertainty about ingredients. Non-Jews wouldn't have any reason to care about the restrictions of Jewish law, after all.

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna lists things that, if they belong to heathens, are forbidden to Jews. First on the list is wine, and the prohibition extends to deriving any benefit. (For example, even if you can't drink it, you might have been able to sell it. Nope.) The g'mara derives the prohibition from the verse "who did eat of the fat of their sacrifices and drank the wine of their drink-offerings" (Deut 32:38). It then goes on to explain that boiled wine is ok because it is unfit for idolatrous offerings, but anecdotal evidence shows that not all the sages agreed with that leniency. As we reach today's daf, R' Assi says in the name of R' Yochanan that there are three kinds of wine: libation-wine (yayin nesech), from which it's forbidden to derive any benefit, ordinary heathen wine, from which it's also forbidden to derive any benefit (but the consequences are less severe if you do), and wine of an Israelite that was deposited with a heathen, which is forbidden to drink but permitted to benefit. But wait, said R' Yochanan, wine in this last category can be guarded by a seal and then it's ok. (The concern is tampering.) R' Eleazar requires a double seal. (29b-31a)

We're really particular about wine, because wine is used for sanctification (Shabbat, holidays, weddings...). It's not just a matter of what's kosher to drink. That said, I do sometimes balk a bit at the stringencies today; if, for example, the bottle of wine has been in my sight since I opened it, I can be confident that the non-Jewish guest didn't pour out a libation-offering from it. But eh, most readily-available kosher wine is mevushal (boiled) anyway, so I can follow halacha and avoid embarrassing guests at the same time. And learning about all this (many years ago) did make me re-evaluate accepting wine offered in the SCA, because some SCA people actually are neo-pagans.

cellio: (talmud)

We learn in the mishna: one should not place cattle in heathens' inns, because they are suspected of immoral practice with them. The g'mara responds: but according to a baraita we can buy their cattle for sacrifices, so shouldn't we be concerned there too? The g'mara then answers: the heathen surely won't sell an animal he has dedicated to idolatry, and for other immoral uses he won't put his profit at risk, so it's ok to buy their animals. After further discussion, there appears to be a dispute between R' Eliezer, who forbids buying a red heifer from heathens, and the sages, who permit it. The sages follow the baraita while R' Eliezer follows the mishna. Final answer? I don't know. (22b-23a.)

They're talking about the red heifer because, among animals offered in the temple, it's super-important.

Today's daf is 24.

cellio: (talmud)

The g'mara on today's daf discusses the heavenly penalty for idolatry, saying that even if people turn away from it, they still won't merit eternal life -- some sins are too grave. (I don't yet know if that's the final conclusion; we're in the middle of a discussion here.) The g'mara then talks about other grave transgressions, including the following story.

It was said of R' Eleazer ben Dordia that he would not pass by any harlot in the world. Once he heard of a certain harlot in a town by the sea who accepted a purse of denarii for her services, and he took a purse and crossed seven rivers for her sake. When he was with her, she blew a breath and said: as this blown breath cannot return to its place, so too will R' Eleazer ben Dordia never be received in repentance. He went from her and sat between two hills and mountains, crying out: oh hills and mountains, plead for mercy for me! They said: how can we when we need it ourselves? For it says: for the mountains shall depart and the hills be removed (all these prooftexts are from Isaiah). So he called out to Heaven and Earth and they too said: how can we when we need it ourselves? For it says: the heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a garment. He then tried the sun and moon and they declined, for it says: the moon shall be confounded and the sun ashamed. Ok, how about stars and constellations? No can do: all the hosts of heaven shall moulder away. So finally he said: the matter depends on me alone! He placed his head between his knees and wept aloud until his soul departed. Then a heavenly voice (a bat kol) was heard proclaiming: "Rabbi Eleazar ben Dordia is destined for the life of the world to come!" Rabbi, on hearing of it, wept and said: one may acquire eternal life after many years, another in one hour! (17a)

(My copy has "Dordia" once and "Dordai" once. I can't tell for sure from the unpointed Aramaic (דורדיא), but "Dordia" seems to fit those consonants a little better. I've never heard either name before.)

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna (a couple pages ago) listed some of the gentiles' festivals that are considered idolatrous, including some having to do with kings. The g'mara then goes on to talk about various gentile kings, including the following story.

When Onkelos son of Kalonymus, a Roman (and maybe a nephew of Titus), converted to Judaism, the emperor sent soldiers to arrest him. Onkelos told them scriptural verses and they, too, converted. The emperor sent another group of soldiers, telling them not to say anything to him. As they were leaving, Onkelos said "let me just tell you an ordinary thing", and proceeded to explain how, unlike an earthly king, the Heavenly King carries light before His people, citing the pillar of fire that led Israel. (With earthly kings, others carry torches for them but they would never carry torches for their subjects.) They, too, converted to Judaism. The emperor sent yet more soldiers, telling them not to enter any conversation with him. They took hold of him, and on the way out he touched the mezuzah on his doorpost and said: a mortal king dwells within and has guards without, but the Holy One Blessed be He guards without while His servants dwell within. They, too, converted, and the emperor sent no more. (top of 11a; today's daf is 10)

Onkelos went on to write a translation of the torah (with a little elaboration) into Aramaic, the common language of the day. Targum Onkelos is printed alongside the Hebrew in many editions today for study.

cellio: (talmud)

New tractate -- onward to idolatry! Today's daf is 3, but we'll start with the mishna that begins 2.

The mishna says: on the three days preceding the festivities of idolaters, it is forbidden to do business with them, to lend or borrow articles with them, to advance or receive money from them, or to repay a debt or receive repayment. A note in the Soncino edition says this restriction is lest any benefit to them from these activities lead to them rejoicing before their idols -- it would be as if we contributed to that idolatry. R' Yehudah says we should receive repayment from them as this can only depress them, but the rabbis say even if it is depressing at the time, in the end they are glad of it. (2a) Later the g'mara gives another reason: we avoid receiving as an extra protection against giving/lending.

cellio: (talmud)

For certain disputes the torah mandates that the defendant takes an oath to avoid paying a debt or damages. The mishna on today's daf then lists some exceptions (which the g'mara will discuss at some length). The following take an oath and receive payment, i.e. the plaintiff swears and collects: the hired laborer, he who has been robbed, he who has been wounded, he whose opponent is suspected of making a false oath, and the shopkeeper with his account book. How does this work? The mishna explains the first case: the laborer says to his employer, "give me my wages that you owe me", the employer says "I have paid you already", and the laborer says "I have not received it" -- the laborer takes an oath and the employer must pay him. R' Yehudah says: there is no oath at all (from either) unless there is partial admission, for example the laborer says you owe me fifty denari and the employer says I have paid you one gold dinar. According to a note in the Soncino edition, the torah would not have required an oath from the defendant if there is no admission, and so we do not impose an oath on the plaintiff in that case. (The g'mara argues about this.) (44b)

cellio: (talmud)

A (lengthy) mishna discusses oaths of deposit. This is the case where somebody asks for his property back from someone else (for example, because he lent it, but this could also cover theft, found objects, and other cases), and that person says "I don't have it" and swears to that, either directly or indirectly. The mishna says that oaths of deposit (and the penalties for violating them) apply to men and women, to relatives and non-relatives, to those qualified to be witnesses and those not qualified, before the beit din (court) or not before it, and directly and indirectly sworn. (There is discussion of different penalties for direct and indirect.) What does it mean by indirect? Reuven says "give me my property that is on deposit with you", Shimon says "I don't have anything of yours", Reuven says "I adjure you", and Shimon answers "amen" -- he has validated the oath but not actually said "I swear" with his own mouth, and this counts as an oath. (36b)

Today's daf is 37.

cellio: (talmud)

In a court case, the rabbis teach, the litigants stand. R' Yehudah said: I heard that if the court desires to allow them to sit, they may do so. What is prohibited? That one stand and the other sit, or that one speaks all he wishes and the other is bidden to be brief. The rabbis connect this to the verse "in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor" (Lev 19:15). Another interpretation of this verse: in righteousness shall you judge your neighbor means judge him in the scale of merit -- that is, if you see him doing something that appears to be wrong, look for a favorable interpretation of his actions. Another interpretation of the verse, from R' Yosef: he who is with you (your neighbor) in Torah and precepts, endeavor to judge him favorably. (30a)

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna (near the end of the previous page) gives some rules for precisely interpreting oaths. If a man said "I swear I shall not eat" and he both ate and drank, he is liable only once. But if he said "I swear I shall not eat and I shall not drink" and he ate and drank, he is liable twice. If "I swear I shall not eat" and he ate wheat, spelt and rye breads, only once; if he enumerated them in the oath, then once per type he ate. The mishna gives more examples of this pattern.

The g'mara then discusses eating and drinking. If he said "I swear I shall not eat" and he drank, R' Hiyya b. Abin says in the name of Sh'muel that he is liable, because drinking is included in eating. But, Abaye says, if drinking is included in eating, then what do we make of the one who swears not to eat and not to drink? That's redundant! Raba (I think it's Raba) answers that drinking is included in eating, but if somebody separated it out then that person is clearly making a distinction, and so we hold him liable for each separate case. I'm a little surprised that the g'mara here doesn't use the part about the bread -- bread is bread, but again, we have a case of somebody separately swearing about different types and being held liable for each type. (22b-23a)

cellio: (talmud)

In discussing what to do if one is ritually impure and in the temple (which is consecrated), we need to know a precise boundary -- is it just the temple and courtyard itself, or does it include the additions that have been made to the area over time? The mishna says that it is the same whether one entered the temple court or the addition to the temple court. In arguing that additions are also sanctified, it says that additions are not made to the city or to the temple compartments except by king, prophet, urim and tummim, or Sanhedrin of 71 judges, and with two loaves of thanksgiving, song, and the beit din walking in procession with all of Israel following behind them. (14a)

In other words, expanding the sanctified temple grounds is a really big deal.

Today's daf is 16. The g'mara there talks, among other things, about the songs. Psalm 100 is sung with harps, lyres, and cymbals all around the city.

cellio: (talmud)

The g'mara is discussing the mishna about which offerings atone for different kinds of sins involving tumah, ritual impurity. In the case where there is no knowledge either before or after, i.e. the person who sinned has no clue that he did anything wrong, the rabbis discuss how we know that the Yom Kippur, new moon, and festival goats atone. All of them are called sin-offerings, but that doesn't necessarily mean these particular sins. Previous discussion explained Yom Kippur. In arguing for the new moon, R' Yehudah says we know this because the text says "a sin offering unto the Lord", which means a sin known only to the Lord, meaning not known to the person who erred. (There's a lot of discussion about the choice of preposition.) The g'mara then derives from textual similarities that the festival goats also atone for this category of sin. (9a-b)

cellio: (talmud)

(ShEvuot, as in "oaths", not ShAvuot, as in "weeks".)

The tractate opens with the mishna saying there are four types of oaths ("two, subdivided into four"), clarified by the g'mara: positive and negative, past and future: "I swear I shall", "I swear I shall not", "I swear I did", and "I swear I did not". It then talks about cases where information was known or unknown, and discusses the different ways that false oaths of different types are atoned for -- some by a sin offering he brings himself, some by the goat on Yom Kippur, some by the offerings brought on the new moon (Rosh Chodesh), and some by the offerings brought on festivals. Different rabbis assign them differently. In the g'mara, some rabbis say that there's no penalty for a future positive oath that turns out to be wrong ("I shall X" and you didn't X) because you didn't actually take an action. Others disagree. Given that we have positive commandments that you are liable for not doing, I'm not sure how that reasoning works (but I haven't read all the g'mara for this mishna yet).

The mishna talks mostly about oaths concerning actions taken while in a state of ritual impurity (tumah), distinguishing cases where you knew you were tamei but didn't know the action was prohibited, cases where you didn't know you were tamei but knew the action was prohibited to those in that state, cases where you knew but forgot, and more. The mishna occupies most of this daf (both sides), so I expect the g'mara to have more to say on all this.

cellio: (talmud)

The torah calls for cities of refuge to be set aside, so-called because an accidental killer can flee there and be protected. (Somebody who intentionally commits murder is subject to the death penalty, but somebody who accidentally kills is not.) Per the torah, the accidental killer must live in the city of refuge until the current kohein gadol (high priest) dies, at which time he is free to go.

The mishna on today's daf says that mothers of high priests would provide food and clothing for the accidental killers in the cities, so that the killers would not pray for their sons' deaths. The g'mara asks: so what if they pray -- do you really think those baseless prayers would be answered? A venerable old scholar (yes, that's what it says) reported what he heard from Raba: the high priests were not without blame, as they should have implored Divine grace to avert the sorrows of their generation and failed to do so. (11a)

That sounds like a task akin to eilu d'varim, the tasks we are commanded to do but can never do enough of. Can we really hold the kohein gadol responsible for not doing more to prevent sorrow and sin in his generation? On the other hand, we know from the aftermath of the oven of Achnai that heartfelt prayers of sorrow can be answered, so maybe the rabbis, and the priests' mothers, are covering their bases ("just in case").

cellio: (talmud)

The end of Sanhedrin leads right into the beginning of Makkot ("blows"), which begins by discussing punishments imposed on false witnesses. (The word here is zomemim; it sounds like there might be different types of false witnesses.) The torah tells us that false witnesses receive the punishment they sought to impose on someone else, but that doesn't always work. The first mishna talks about zomemim who lie about a kohein's status, but just applying that penalty to them if they're not kohanim doesn't seem to do much. (That's my read, not the talmud's text.)

The mishna on today's daf teaches: if witnesses testify that somebody owes his friend two hundred zuz and they are found to be zomemim, they are flogged and ordered to pay corresponding damages according to R' Meir. But the sages say: one who is ordered to pay damages is not also flogged. And if witnesses testify that somebody is liable for 40 lashes and they are found to be zomemim, they receive 80 -- 40 for "do not testify falsely" and 40 for "you shall do to him as he sought to do to his fellow". These are the words of R' Meir, but the sages say they receive only 40 lashes. (4a)

R' Meir is arguing in the second case (and according to the g'mara also in the first) that there are two separate violations so we impose two separate punishments. The sages seem to be saying that there is one violation, the false testimony, for which there is one punishment, which can vary depending on what the false testimony was about. Here money trumps lashes; I don't know if that's a general rule. (I do know that somebody subject to both the death penalty and a fine does not pay the fine, so perhaps the fine is treated as more severe than lashes?) Update: oh hey, I asked about this 2.5 years ago! No answer yet, though.

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna lists more groups that have no portion in Olam HaBa, the World to Come, all based on proof-texts (i.e. not derivation): the generation of the flood, the generation of the dispersion (from the tower of Bavel), the men of S'dom, the ten spies (who spoke against the land, leading to 40 years in the wilderness), the generation of the wilderness, the congregation of Korach. On today's daf the g'mara discusses the wickedness of the men of S'dom, which is about cruelty and corruption of justice.

In S'dom, if a man assaulted another's wife and bruised her, the court would say "give her to him that she may become pregnant for you". If one cut off the ear of his neighbor's ass, they would say to the neighbor: give it to him until it grows back. If one wounded another they would say to the victim: pay him a fee for bleeding you. If a visitor came, they told him to lie down on a certain bed and they cut or stretched him to fit. If a poor man came, every resident would give him a coin with his own name written on it, but nobody would give him bread. When he died, they each came and collected their coins. Whoever invited a stranger to a banquet was stripped of his garments. A maiden gave a poor man bread (hidden in a pitcher), and when the townsfolk found out they tied her to the parapet and coated her in honey so the bees consumed her. And this is why the torah says "and the cry of S'dom and 'Amorah was great". (107b-108a mishna, 109b g'mara)

The torah text about S'dom is widely misunderstood, in part due to the misderivation of the English word "sodomy". If you read Genesis 19, you'll see that the crowd gathering at Lot's door wanted to rape the visitors. Because the visitors were men, people read this as being about homosexuality, but that's not really the issue here. The men of S'dom were violent and cruel, to men and women.

cellio: (talmud)

Remember last week when we talked about the three kings and four commoners who do not merit a place in Olam Haba, the World to Come? The g'mara has just gotten to a discussion of the first of them, Yeroboam (one of the kings). R' Yochanan said: why did Yeroboam merit sovereignty? Because he reproved King Solomon for his wicked ways. (King Solomon had fallen into idolatry with his excessive wives.) And why did Yeroboam merit punishment? Because he reproved Solomon publicly. R' Nachman said: Yeroboam's conceit drove him out of the world, for even though he was destined to reign over ten tribes after splitting off from Solomon's heir, he used deceit to secure his position -- and not only that, but he built two golden calves for Israel to worship "at home" so they wouldn't have to go up to Jerusalem. (101b)

Today's daf is 102.

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna that begins the current chapter talks about who has shares in the World to Come (Olam HaBa). We learn: all Israel have a share, except that the following have none: one who holds that resurrection of the dead (in the time of the messiah) is not biblical doctrine;1 one who holds that the torah was not divinely revealed, and an apikorus (here meaning a heretic; the word derives from Epicurean). R' Akiva adds: one who read uncanonical books; this might refer to Gnostic books or might refer to ascribing scriptural status to other books. R' Akiva also adds one who says a certain kind of magical charm, and Abba Saul adds one who pronounces the divine name as it is written. The mishna then goes on to single out seven individual people who have no share in the World to Come: the three kings Jeroboam, Ahab, and Manashe, and the four commoners Bilaam, Doeg, Ahitophel, and Gehazi. (90a)

The g'mara goes on for pages and pages from this mishna -- the next nine pages revolve around resurrection of the dead and the messiah. Today's daf, 95, is in the midst of that discussion, which is why I went back to the mishna rather than diving in there. I don't yet know the reasons for all seven people who are singled out.

1 A note in my translaton points out that the Sadducees and the Samaritans denied resurrection (and were relevant groups in mishnaic times).

(The last two Thursdays were holidays, hence the interruption in daf bits.)

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna teaches: the following must be saved from sinning even at the cost of their lives: one who pursues his neighbor to slay him (the rodef), or pursues a male for illicit relations, or pursues a maiden to dishonor her. But one who pursues an animal to violate it, or who would desecrate Shabbat, or who would commit idolatry, must not be saved at the cost of his life. There is disagreement in the g'mara about the idolater and the Shabbat-desecrater, and this leads to the well-known teaching of when a person must sacrifice himself rather than sin. In all torah laws save three, if one is told "transgress or be killed", he transgresses; the three exceptions are murder, illicit relations including adultery, and idolatry. This is then clarified: one transgresses to save his life only if it happens in private, but if told to publicly violate even a minor mitzvah or die, he must accept martyrdom. (73a mishna, 74a g'mara)

cellio: (talmud)

Blasphemy is a capital offense. Conviction for a capital offense requires careful testimony of two direct witnesses. This poses a problem, as they must testify to what exactly the person said. To minimize the damage, the court sent everybody out except for the witnesses and then told the first witness: tell us literally what he said. The witness did, and the judges tore their garments. The second witness then said "I heard this too" without repeating the testimony. (The mishna then says the third witness does likewise. I'm not sure where the third witness came from, as only two are required.)

The g'mara discusses tearing one's garments when hearing blasphemy. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel that one tears only when hearing a curse of the tetragramaton, but not when hearing other divine names. Rabbi Chiyya says that one who hears God's name in a blasphemous context today doesn't tear his garments, because if he did the garment would be torn to shreds. But who is R' Chiyya talking about? If we say that he hears this blasphemy from Jews, are Jews so irreverent as to frequently demean the name of God? No, he must be talking about hearing it from gentiles. But do gentiles know this specific name? No, if we're talking about gentiles it must be in regard to any name, and there'd be enough of that to leave one's garments in shreds. The g'mara concludes that nowadays one is not obligated to tear his garments when hearing the curse of a gentile and a curse using another name, but originally one was obligated to tear for both, contrary to what Shmuel says. (mishna 56a, g'mara 60a)

In case you're wondering (I did!) why the second witness doesn't tear his garment on hearing the first witness repeat the blasphemy, the g'mara says it's because he already tore his garment when he heard the original blasphemer. The judges, however, are hearing it for the first time.

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna on today's daf lists those for whom the death penalty is stoning. (There are four methods of execution in halacha, of which stoning is the most severe.) Stoning is for:

  • a man who commits incest with his mother, his father's wife, or his son's wife, or a man who commits adultery with a betrothed maiden

  • a man who sexually abuses another man or a beast, or a woman who commits bestiality (the g'mara here does not discuss what counts as abuse)

  • a blasphemer, an idolater, or one who gives of his seed to Molech (Molech was a foreign god to whom people made child sacrifices)

  • one who incites individuals to idolatry or seduces a whole town to idolatry

  • a necromancer, wizard, or sorcerer (I'm unclear about the difference between the latter two)

  • one who desecrates Shabbat

  • one who curses his father or mother

  • a wayward and rebellious son

(53a)

cellio: (talmud)

Previously this tractate described the extra care taken in capital cases, lest someone be wrongly condemned. If someone is found guilty, then right up to the point of execution they continue to look for reasons to acquit him.

The mishna then discusses how stoning (one of four types of execution) is carried out. The two witnesses whose testimony led to the guilty verdict go first -- the witnesses themselves must participate in the execution. The court, witnesses, and observers take the condemned to a place that is twice a man's height. One witness pushes him off so that he lands on his heart. They then turn him onto his back to see if the fall killed him. If not, the other witness takes a (prepared, heavy) stone and drops it on his chest. If that doesn't kill him, then all Israel -- meaning all those assembled -- stone him. (45a)

The g'mara does not discuss how this group stoning is conducted, but it is unlikely to resemble the "angry mob" sometimes depicted in media.

Twice a man's height is not that long a fall. (I wonder how often the push alone was fatal.) I don't know what factors led to this height being the practice and not something a little higher. (Presumably they don't want to go too high out of dignity for the body; they want to execute him, not splatter him.)

Today's daf is 46.

cellio: (talmud)

The mishna discusses how witnesses are addressed (before testifying). Witnesses in capital cases were brought in and intimidated thus: perhaps what you say is based on conjecture or hearsay, or is something you were told to say by somebody else. Perhaps you are unaware that we are going to scrutinize your evidence by cross-examination and inquiry.

Know that capital cases are not like monetary ones; you can make monetary restitution (if you're lying) and effect atonement, but in a capital case you are liable for the blood of the accused and all the descendants he now won't have. We learn this from Kayin, where it says "the bloods of your brother cry out to Me" -- bloods, not blood, so it includes potential descendants. For this reason man was created alone, to teach that whoever destroys a single soul is guilty as if he destroyed an entire world, and whoever preserves a single soul has merit as if he preserved an entire world because all mankind originated from one man.

Man was created alone for the sake of peace among men, so that none can say "my father was greater than yours". And further, he was created alone to show the power of the Holy One blessed be He, for if a man strikes many coins from one mold they all resemble each other, but God fashioned every man in the stamp of the first man and yet they all look different. Therefore every person is obligated to say: the world was created for my sake. (37a)

(Today's daf is 39, but I wanted to cover this mishna because parts of this are famous but we don't always hear them in the original context.)

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