Monica

daf bit: Menachot 76

Fri, 26 Oct 2018 00:22:14 GMT

One ephah = three seahs (dry measure). The omer meal offering consisted of a tenth of an ephah of flour taken from three seahs of barley -- that is, an ephah (three seahs) of barley was reaped, ground, sifted, and resifted to get a tenth of an ephah of fine flour. Why the poor yield? Because this is the new (fresh) harvest and there is more offal and bran in fresh corn than in dry. (So say the rabbis; I have no agricultural experience to draw on.) The two loaves consisted of two tenths taken from three seahs; they're wheat rather than barley, so even though it's also new and not dried, the yield is better. And the showbread consisted of 24 tenths from 24 seahs, the best yield of all, because it was made from old produce. (In all cases this is "fine flour"; I don't know how this compares to yields for ordinary household use where you can be less picky.) (76b)

comments

daf bit: Menachot 68

Fri, 19 Oct 2018 03:09:04 GMT

On the day after Pesach they brought the omer (grain) offering for the first time (in the season). The mishna teaches: after the omer was offered the new corn was permitted immediately. (Until the omer is offered to God, we can't eat the new crops.) However, for those who lived outside of Jerusalem, who could not directly witness this being done, new corn was permitted only after midday. That was when the temple stood. After the destruction, R' Yochanan b. Zakkai said it was forbidden throughout the entire day. R' Yehudah understands the torah to forbid it the entire day regardless, and questions why it could be permitted to distant people earlier when the temple stood. The mishna then answers that in the time of the temple they knew the beit din (court) would not delay the offering, so by midday it's safe. (68a)

(Today's daf is 69.)

comments

daf bit: Menachot 63

Fri, 12 Oct 2018 01:09:51 GMT

The torah describes several different ways of preparing the meal-offering, all of which are valid. But you have to stick to what you said you'd do: the mishna teaches that if a man said "I take upon myself to bring a meal-offering prepared on the griddle" he can't bring one prepared in a pan or vice-versa. What's the difference between a griddle and a pan? R' Yose the Galilean says the pan has a lid and the griddle does not. R' Chanina b. Gamaliel says the pan is deep and what is prepared in it is spongy, while a griddle is flat and what is prepared on it is hard. And if a man said "I take upon myself to bring a meal-offering baked in an oven" he must not bring what is baked in a stove or on tiles or in the fireplaces of the Arabs. R' Yehudah says a stove is ok. According to notes in the Soncino edition, a stove is a small oven that can hold only one pot, and the fireplace of the Arabs is an improvised fireplace, a cavity in the ground laid with clay. (63a)

Today's daf is 62.

comments

daf bit: Menachot 55

Fri, 05 Oct 2018 02:23:52 GMT

We learn from the torah that meal-offerings must be eaten unleavened. The mishna on today's daf teaches: all meal-offerings must be kneaded with lukewarm water and watched lest they become leavened. If one allows the remainder (what is left after the handful is removed) to become leavened, he transgresses a prohibition. The g'mara explains: had the torah only said "what you bring to the Lord shall not be leavened", we would know that the restriction is only on the handful. But the text says "meal-offering" so it means the whole of it cannot be leavened, not just the part that is offered on the altar. The rabbis then continue: it says "that you shall bring", which implies that if you bring it first and then add leaven right there at the altar, that might be ok? The question is left unresolved. (55a mishna, 57a g'mara)

I expected a connection in the g'mara to the rules for matzah on Pesach, but I don't see one. I wouldn't be surprised if the discussion of that -- wherever it is -- refers back to this one.

comments

daf bit: Sukkah

Fri, 28 Sep 2018 00:54:28 GMT

Today's daf bit is a seasonal diversion into tractate Sukkah. During the week-long festival we are commanded to "dwell" in sukkot (booths), which the rabbis understand to mean eating and sleeping. But we learn in a mishna (Sukkah 25a) that casual eating is permitted outside the sukkah. What is casual eating? In the g'mara (26a) R' Yosef says the volume of two or three eggs, but Abaye says this sometimes suffices for a whole meal! Rather, Abaye says, it's only as much as a student eats before proceeding to the college assembly (a small breakfast, it sounds like). The g'mara continues: casual eating is permitted outside the sukkah, but not casual sleeping (a nap). Why not? Because you might sleep soundly and it turns out to be a real sleep, which you were required to do in the sukkah. Rami b. Ezekiel says a casual sleep means the time it takes to walk one hundred cubits.

Today's daf is Menachot 48.

comments

daf bit: Menachot 41

Fri, 21 Sep 2018 01:49:51 GMT

The torah commands men to place tzitzit (fringes) on the corners of their garments. Is this an obligation on the person or on the garment? That is, are you required to wear a garment with corners (and attach tzitzit to them), or are you allowed to wear anything, but if it is a garment with corners, you must put tzitzit on it? In the g'mara, Rabbah bar R' Huna says it is an obligation on the garment, and not just the garment you're currently wearing -- all of your four-cornered garments must have tzitzit. There is some disagreement, and then the g'mara tells the following story:

An angel once found R' Kattina wearing a wrap (a garment that does not require tzitzit) and exclaimed: "Kattina, Kattina -- a wrap in summer and a cloak in winter, and what is to happen to the law of tzitzit?" R' Kattina answered: "and do you punish a person who omits to perform a positive precept?" "In a time of wrath, yes", the angel said. Now if you hold that tzitzit is an obligation on the person this makes sense, but if it's an obligation on the garment, why is there any punishment incurred? R' Kattina argued thus to the angel, asking "would the All-Merciful punish somebody for wearing a garment not subject to tzitzit?" The angel replied, "you find every excuse to free yourself from the law of tzitzit." (41a)

Despite the angel's opinion, as I understand it the halacha is according to Rabbah -- the obligation is on the garment, not on the person -- but there is really strong urging to seek out the opportunity because it's an established custom and not difficult.

comments

daf bit: Menachot 34

Fri, 14 Sep 2018 03:57:23 GMT

In a discussion of the proper placement of the mezuzah, the scroll we place on the doorposts of our houses, the g'mara asks the following question: the torah says "you shall write these words on the doorposts of your house" -- doesn't this mean we should write them directly on the stones of the house? Where does the scroll come from? The g'mara answers that in other places that talk about writing it is onto a scroll or parchment -- a bill of divorce, the sotah's cursed water, and the torah scroll written by a king. On the other hand, the torah also says "write" when talking about the memorial stones that the Israelites will erect (containing the torah text) when they enter the land, and that's stone, so maybe we do write on our houses. No, the g'mara continues, we infer the meaning of "writing" from writing that was intended for all time, not for writing that was in its time only -- the laws of divorce, sotah, and torah scrolls remain, but the stones were for that generation only. But wait, another rabbi says -- you're talking about stones, but the torah says write them on your doorposts; how do we know it doesn't mean literally writing on the doorposts? Because when the torah says "and you shall write them" it means a perfect writing (there's some linguistic manipulation going on here), and any writing on stones or wood would be imperfect. Only a scroll can enable perfect writing. (34a)

If you take a close look at a torah scroll or mezuzah -- or any inked calligraphy on vellum or parchment -- you will see that the ink is actually sitting mainly on top of the surface, unlike with paper -- or wood -- where some of it is absorbed. Finished wood of the right type might not behave that way, but that's probably not what people use to make doorposts. I know more about writing than about wood, so I can't carry this analysis much farther.

comments

daf bit: Menachot 27

Fri, 07 Sep 2018 02:21:00 GMT

The mishna first talks about how if part of something to be offered on the altar, like part of the handful of grain or part of the cup of wine, is missing, that invalidates the whole offering. It then goes on to talk about other things that can be invalidated by quantity reductions. The absence of one of the two goats for Yom Kippur invalidates the other; the absence of one of the two lambs for the festival of Shavu'ot invalidates the other; the absence of one of the two loaves or one of the two rows of showbread invalidates the other; the absence of one of the four plants used in the lulav on Sukkot invalidates the others; and there are more cases. The g'mara supports each statement with a text. (27a)

comments

daf bit: Menachot 18

Fri, 31 Aug 2018 02:25:52 GMT

A note in the Soncino edition of the talmud explains the procedure for a meal-offering: first some oil was poured in a vessel and then some fine flour was put in; then more oil was poured in and it was mingled with the flour. Then it was baked into cakes and broken in pieces. The remainder of the oil was poured on it, and the handful was taken from there. That's the baseline. The mishna now talks about deviations: if he didn't pour in the oil (at the end), or he didn't mingle it, or he didn't break the whole cake into pieces, or he didn't salt it, or he didn't wave it or bring it to the horn of the altar, or broke it into pieces that are too large or too small, or he didn't annoint it with oil when he needed to -- for any of these deviations, it is nonetheless a valid offering. (18a)

(Today's daf is 20.)

comments

daf bit: Menachot 6

Fri, 17 Aug 2018 00:43:07 GMT

Last week we finished Zevachim, about animal offerings, and now move on to Menachot, about meal-offerings. The torah describes how these are done: the kohein takes a handful of the meal, puts it in a vessel, and turns it to smoke on the altar, and the rest is made into food for the kohanim. The mishna on today's daf talks about (among things) this handful. The handful must be taken with the right hand; if he took it with the left it is invalid. Ben Batyra says if this happens he puts it back and then takes with his right hand. If, when he takes it (with his right hand), what he takes includes a stone or a grain of salt or a drop of frankincense, it is invalid because the foreign object diminishes the volume of the grain too much. (I'm assuming that grains of salt were bigger than what we are used to today, else how would he know?) An offering is invalid if it is either too much (overflowing his hand) or too little (he took with his fingertips only); the kohein needs to take a full handful of unadulterated grain. (6a)

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 112

Fri, 03 Aug 2018 01:12:59 GMT

The mishna says: before the mishkan (tabernacle) was set up, bamot ("high places", other altars) were permitted and the service was performed by the firstborn. After the mishkan was set up, bamot were forbidden and the service was performed by the kohanim (priests). When the mishkan was in Gilgal during the conquest of the land, bamot were again permitted. When they came to Shiloh there was a stone building and bamot were again forbidden. When the miskhan was set up in Nov and then Giv'on, bamot were again permitted. And when the Beit Hamikdash, the Temple, was built in Jerusalem, bamot were forbidden forever, even after the Temple was destroyed. (112b)

The mishna gives us a history lesson, not reasons. I didn't see reasons for some of these (Nov and Giv'on in particular) in a quick scan of six pages of g'mara, but it was only a quick scan.

Today's daf is 111.

comments

daf bit: Tu b'Av, when young women's thoughts turn to love...

Fri, 27 Jul 2018 01:39:51 GMT

Tu b'Av, the 15th of Av, follows on the heels of Tisha b'Av (the 9th). While Tisha b'Av is a day of great mourning, Tu b'Av is a day of celebration. Tu b'Av is tomorrow (Friday); here is something from the talmud about it, from tractate Taanit.

R' Shimon b. Gamaliel said: there never were in Israel greater days of joy than Tu b'Av and Yom Kippur. On these days the (unmarried) daughters of Jerusalem would go out in borrowed white garments -- borrowed to avoid embarrassing anybody over wealth -- and danced in the vineyards, exclaiming: young man, lift up your eyes and see what you choose for yourself! Do not look for beauty but for good family. Grace is deceitful and beauty is vain, but a woman that fears the Lord shall be praised (quoting Proverbs), and also: give her of the fruit of her hands, and let her works praise her in the gates.

The g'mara asks: it's obvious why the day of atonement, when our sins are forgiven, calls for celebration, but what happened on Tu b'Av? Various reasons are offered -- the day the tribes were allowed to intermarry, the day the tribe of Binyamin was allowed to re-enter Israel, the day the generation of the wilderness ceased dying out, the day Hosea removed Jeroboam's blockades that prevented pilgrimage to Jerusalem, or the day each year that they stopped cutting trees for the altar. (26b mishna, 30b-31a g'mara)

Is R' Shimon really saying that this kind of celebration happened on Yom Kippur too? It seems to say "these days", but I understand that this celebration was unique to Tu b'Av. I guess R' Shimon didn't have the only opinion on the matter, though it's not contradicted here.

Today's daf is Zevachim 104.

comments

daf bit: Tisha b'Av (Gittin 55-56)

Thu, 19 Jul 2018 12:49:41 GMT

Tisha b'Av, commemorating the destruction of the temple, is this weekend. (Shabbat is the actual date, but we don't mourn on Shabbat so the fast and other observances are pushed off to Sunday.) The talmud in tractate Gittin is relevant, so today we'll cover that instead of the usual daf.

The g'mara starting on 55b says that the destruction of Jerusalem came through a Kamtza and a Bar Kamtza. How so? A certain man had a friend Kamtza and an enemy Bar Kamtza. He made a party and told his servant to bring Kamtza, but instead the servant brought Bar Kamtza. When the man saw his enemy he said "what are you doing here? Get out!" Bar Kamtza replied, "since I am here, let me stay and I'll pay for whatever I eat and drink", but the man said no. "Then let me give you half the cost of the party" -- no. "Then let me pay for the whole party" -- and still the man said no, and took him by the hand and put him out. Bar Kamtza then reasoned: the rabbis were there as guests and saw all this but did not stop him, so they must agree with him. I will go and inform against them.

So he went and said to the emperor: the Jews are rebelling against you. "How can I tell?" the emperor asked. Bar Kamtza said: send them an offering and see if they will offer it on the altar. So the emperor sent a fine calf, but on the way Bar Kamtza made a small blemish on it so it would not be an acceptable offering under Jewish law. The rabbis were inclined to offer it anyway to avoid giving offense, but R. Zechariah b. Abkulas said this could mislead Jews about proper offerings. They then proposed killing Bar Kamtza so he couldn't inform against them, but R. Zechariah asked: is making a blemish a capital offense? R' Yochanan then said: through the scruplulousness of R' Zechariah our House has been destroyed, our Temple burnt, and we have been exiled from our land. (55b-56a)

The rabbis say that the second temple (the one being talked about here) was destroyed because of sinat chinam, baseless hatred within Yisrael. This episode with Bar Kamtza illustrates the problem; it's not that the temple was destroyed because of this specific incident, but that this behavior was considered normal and acceptable -- none of the witnesses acted. If we can't treat each other decently, maybe we don't deserve the temple and the land.

(Today's daf is Zevachim 97.)

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 89

Fri, 13 Jul 2018 01:42:37 GMT

The mishna gives some rules for precedence (priority). First, whatever is more frequent takes precedence over the less-frequent:

The daily offering over the additional offering.
The additional offering of Shabbat over that of Rosh Chodesh (new month).
The additional of Rosh Chodesh over that of Rosh Hashana (new year).

And also, whatever is more sacred takes precedence. The mishna gives several specific cases, including (this is not the complete list):

The blood of a sin offering over that of a burnt offering.
A sin offering over a guilt offering.
A guilt offering over either a thanksgiving offering or the offering brought by a nazarite.
A thanksgiving or nazarite offering over a peace offering.
A firstling over a tithe.

These are accompanied by explanations of how we know the one is more sacred than the other. It's a busy mishna.

If these two rules can conflict (frequency versus sanctity), I don't see it addressed here.

Today's daf is 90.

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 75

Fri, 29 Jun 2018 01:11:04 GMT

The current chapter of this tractate is talking about cases where offerings get mixed up, so the kohanim (priests) don't know which one was for which purpose. How you handle it depends on what was mixed up. The mishna here talks about a guilt-offering being mixed up with a peace-offering, and says that they are both handled in accordance with the more stringent law. In particular, while you have two days to eat a peace-offering, if they get mixed up like this then you have only the one day that you would have for a guilt-offering, and only the kohanim can eat it. Also, guilt-offerings have to be slaughtered in a particular place (the north side of the altar) but peace-offerings are more flexible; if they get mixed up then they both have to be slaughtered in the place for guilt-offerings. (75b)

The reason -- or at least a reason -- this matters is that once you designate something for a specific holy purpose, you can't change it. (This is true of offerings, tithes, donations, ritual objects...) So one of those animals was designated as a peace-offering and one was designated as a guilt-offering, and you can't just say "whichever one we treat as the guilt-offering is it". Therefore, they treat both in a way that complies with the stricter rules. Fortunately the rules are not in conflict; one is a proper subset of the other.

I don't know who pays for the loss if the person bringing it had other plans for that peace-offering, which he probably did.

Today's daf is 76.

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 68

Fri, 22 Jun 2018 00:03:11 GMT

Animals brought as offerings need to be fit for the purpose, for example unblemished. An animal that is not fit not only isn't a valid offering but can cause ritual impurity in those who handled it. What happens if something causes it to become unfit after it's been dedicated? The mishna is currently talking specifically about birds, and says: if an unfit person performed the ritual, or if the priest used the wrong hand or did it at night, or if he did it in the wrong place within the sanctuary, it does not cause this ritual impurity. However, if he used a knife (for birds they pinch off the head), or if he offered turtle-doves when they're too young or pigeons when they're too old, or if he offered a bird with a crippled wing or a missing foot, all these cause ritual impurity. The general rule is: all those whose unfitness arose within the sanctuary do not defile, but those that were already unfit do. (68a-b)

Using a knife sounds like something that arose within the sanctuary. I don't see anything here that addresses this, but I should note again that this tractate is very technical and dense and I'm sure I'm missing stuff.

Today's daf is 69.

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 55

Fri, 08 Jun 2018 00:08:34 GMT

Different offerings have different rules for how they are offered and eaten. The olah, or burnt offering, is wholly consumed and so nobody eats any of it. At the end of yesterday's daf the mishna says the communal peace-offering and the guilt-offerings must be slaughtered in a particular place within the temple (the north) and are eaten within the temple, by male priests, a day and a night until midnight. On today's daf the mishna says that the thanksgiving offering and the ram that the nazarite brings are of lesser sanctity; they are slaughtered anywhere within the temple court, and they are eaten in any part of the city, by any person, the same day and night until midnight (except for the parts that are given to the priests). The peace-offering is also of lesser sanctity; it is slaughtered anywhere within the temple court, and it is eaten anywhere in the city by anybody for two days and one night. All of these may be prepared in any manner, in contrast to the Pesach offering (coming up in a couple pages) which must be roasted. (54b-55a)

The thanksgiving and peace offerings are unscheduled and more "donor-driven" than the set communal offerings (times specified in torah) and guilt-offerings (owed when you transgress). I have the impression that the thanksgiving and peace offerings were things you planned a family feast around, so it makes sense that you can eat them anywhere in Jerusalem with anybody you like. I don't yet know why you get an extra day for the peace-offering.

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 47

Fri, 01 Jun 2018 01:33:56 GMT

There are different types of animal offerings, including the olah (burnt offering) and the chatat (sin offering). The purpose of an offering is (apparently) "fixed" at the time the priest slaughters it, and these start out the same way -- so what happens if the person intended to bring a chatat but the priest thought he was doing an olah? According to the mishna it is the intent of the priest that matters, but the g'mara reports a baraita (a teaching contemporary with the mishna) that disagrees, saying that the owner's intent is what matters. The baraita gives the following support for its position: if Reuven stored away something that most people would not keep (trash, something worthless, etc), and Shimon took it and carried it on Shabbat, then Shimon is liable for transgressing Shabbat even though he considers the item worthless -- he is liable because Reuven thought it had worth. So Reuven's intention can be imposed on Shimon (who acted), and similarly we say that the owner's intention is imposed on the priest who is doing the offering. (47a)

The baraita implies something I did not previously know (and have not confirmed). I thought that carrying anything between domains on Shabbat is a problem; this implies that you can carry worthless things. I wonder what the actual halacha is.

Today's daf is 48.

comments

daf bit: Zevachim 41

Thu, 24 May 2018 12:43:55 GMT

Tractate Zevachim talks in great detail about the various offerings brought on the altar. The g'mara is currently discussing the offerings brought for unintentional transgressions of negative commandments (the torah says not to do X and you accidentally do X). Vayikra (Leviticus) chapter 4 describes the procedure for three special cases: if the high priest sins, if the whole community sins, and if a king sins. These three offerings are similar but not identical, and today's g'mara is talking about those differences.

The school of R' Yishmael taught: why does the torah mention burning the lobe and the two kidneys in the case of the priest's bull, but not in the case of the community's bull? This may be compared to a king of flesh and blood who was angry with his friend but spoke little of his offense out of love for him. And what does that mean? According to a note in the Soncino edition, the torah treats the community's offense more briefly rather than dwelling on these details. And the school of R' Yishmael also taught: why is sprinkling the blood before the curtain of the sanctuary mentioned for the priest's bull, but for the community's bull it just says the curtain (no sanctuary)? They give a different reason than brevity -- this can be compared to a king of flesh and blood when one of his provinces sinned against him: if a majority offended then the king withdraws his retainers from them, and in the same way when the whole community of Israel sins God withdraws His presence from them -- and thus there is no sanctuary, just a curtain. (41b)

comments

daf intermission

Thu, 26 Apr 2018 01:37:38 GMT

It's like this. The daf yomi cycle began a new tractate, Zevachim, last week, and I'm finding it close to impenetrable. It's about details of the various offerings and mistakes made in designating and bringing them, and it seems there's some background knowledge I'm lacking.

However! During the period between Pesach and Shavuot, it is customary to read one chapter a week of Pirke Avot, a mishna collection of wisdom teachings. Last week I read from there and tomorrow I'll do the same. Here are the ones I chose.

Last week, from chapter 3:

Rabbi Akiva would say: Beloved is man, for he is created in the image of God; even more beloved is man, for it is revealed to him that he is created in the image of God (Gen 9:6). Beloved are Israel, for they are called children of God; even more beloved, for it is revealed to them (Deut 14:1). Beloved are Isreal, for a precious instrument is given to them; even more beloved, for it is revealed to them that the precious instrument with which the world was created is given to them (Proverbs 4:2, "for a good teaching I have given you; do not forsake it", referring to the torah).

This week, from chapter 4, one of my favorites:

Ben Zoma taught: Who is wise? He who learns from everybody. Who is mightey? He who conquers his impulses. Who is rich? He who is content with his lot. Who is honored? He who honors others. (See Sefaria for proof-texts.)

comments

daf bit: Horayot 10

Thu, 12 Apr 2018 23:13:35 GMT

We learn at the beginning of the third chapter of this tractate, in the mishna, that if an anointed high priest or a king committed a sin and then relinquished his position, the high priest brings a bull as a sin-offering and the king brings a goat -- these are bigger offerings than would be required of laymen. If they relinquished their positions before committing the sin, however, the outcome is different: the high priest still brings a bull but the king brings the offering of a layman. And if they committed their sins before gaining these positions, they are regarded as laymen for purposes of their sin-offerings, even if when they bring them they have the higher positions. (9b-10a)

The g'mara brings proof-texts to support the different rules for former high priests and former rulers, but I don't understand how they're getting this answer from those sources (Lev 4:3 and Lev 4:22).

Today's daf is 12.

comments

daf bit: Horayot 2

Thu, 05 Apr 2018 13:05:01 GMT

Horayot is a short tractate (14 pages) about errors in court judgements.

The tractate leads with the following mishna: if a court rules that any of the ritual commandments in the torah can be transgressed and somebody, hearing their ruling, does so, and that's wrong, he's not liable for punishment because he relied on the court. (We're talking here about questions of application, not theory -- the questions one needs to be able to answer to go about one's life, like whether this food is kosher or that prayer must be said or you can marry this person.)

But if a member of the court who knew that they erred, or a disciple present who is qualified to decide matters of law, follows that ruling, that person is liable. The general rule is: he who is in a position to rely on himself is subject to a penalty, while he who must depend on the court is exempt. The g'mara adds that the first category -- he who relies upon himself -- includes those who usually disregard the decisions of the courts. So it's not just for those learned enough to decide on their own; it's also for those who are willfully unlearned or uninterested. (2a mishna, 2b g'mara)

Today's daf is 5.

comments

daf bit: Avodah Zarah 75

Thu, 29 Mar 2018 12:51:47 GMT

As we near the end of this tractate, the discussion turns to cooking utensils that belonged to idolaters. The rabbis taught: if an Israelite buys utensils from an idolater, unused items are immersed in the mikvah and are then fit for use. Those that were used for cold items only are rinsed and immersed and are then fit. But for items that were used for hot foods it's more complicated. Kettles, heating vessels, and the like must be scalded; utensils used with fire (like spits) must be made white-hot; either way they must then be immersed and are then fit. (75b)

These are also the methods to kasher an item that has been made non-kosher (like if you accidentally use a meat utensil for dairy). Some things can't be kashered, like wooden spoons (too absorbent), and I assume we therefore can't get them used from idolaters at least if they've been used for hot foods. For cold, I don't know.

Today's daf is 73.

comments

daf bit: Avodah Zarah 66

Thu, 22 Mar 2018 12:54:06 GMT

Yayin nesech is wine that has been used for idolatry. We can't drink it or even benefit from it because it's tainted. What if it is spilled on or into something else -- does that taint the mixture too? Does it matter what the effect was? The g'mara discusses several cases -- wine spilled onto grapes (are they cut or whole?), wine spilled onto wheat (does it absorb?), and more. The mishna gives a general rule: whatever gains an advantage because the wine imparted a flavor is prohibited; whatever does not gain an advantage through flavor is permitted. In the g'mara, R' Abbahu in the name of R' Yochanan, along with others, says that if the wine improves the flavor of the other item the mixture is prohibited, but if it makes it taste worse it's ok. R' Meir, however, says that whether it imparts a better or worse flavor, it is forbidden, because we're prohibited from eating from gentiles' cooking vessels even though they impart a worse flavor to their contents because they're used for things like non-kosher meat. (65b-67b)

comments

daf bit: Avodah Zarah 58

Thu, 15 Mar 2018 12:55:05 GMT

We have previously learned that wine touched by heathens cannot be drunk by Jews, because of concerns about their use of wine in idolatrous practices. (There is an exception, in common use today, for wine that has been boiled, because that makes it unfit for idolatry.) The g'mara now tells a story: R' Yochanan b. Arza and R' Yose b. Nehorai were once sitting and drinking wine (from an opaque jug, it seems). A man entered and they said to him "come, pour out for us". After he had poured it in their glass, they learned that he was a heathen. One of them prohibited it for any purpose, and the other permitted it even for drinking. R' Yehoshua b. Levi said: they're both right! He who prohibited it reasoned thus: the heathen must have said to himself, "would it occur to rabbis such as these to drink beer? Surely it is wine!" and he then rendered it unfit. He who permitted it reasoned thus: the heathen must have said to himself, "would it occur to rabbis such as these to have me pour wine for them? It must be beer!" and he did not render it unfit. In this latter case, pouring wine was an unintentional action and we do not decree against unintentional actions. (58a-b)

The g'mara does not discuss the rabbis' own role in the incident (they told the man to pour), or whether it makes a difference if he did it on his own or was following instructions (maybe making him their agent).

Nor does it discuss the presumption that the heathen would know the halacha about restrictions with wine. In fact, the issue of heathens' (lack of) knowledge was an issue in an earlier discussion about kashrut. Remember that the talmud compiles the words of many individual rabbis, so "the talmud says X" and "the talmud says not X" does not mean the talmud is inconsistent. It can mean that two opinions differ (and you need to look up the final halacha if it matters to you), or that the situations were different in some important way. The talmud records all views; it doesn't speak with one voice.

(Today's daf is 59.)

comments