Monica

One ephah = three seahs (dry measure). The omer meal offering consisted of a tenth of an ephah of flour taken from three seahs of barley -- that is, an ephah (three seahs) of barley was reaped, ground, sifted, and resifted to get a tenth of an ephah of fine flour. Why the poor yield? Because this is the new (fresh) harvest and there is more offal and bran in fresh corn than in dry. (So say the rabbis; I have no agricultural experience to draw on.) The two loaves consisted of two tenths taken from three seahs; they're wheat rather than barley, so even though it's also new and not dried, the yield is better. And the showbread consisted of 24 tenths from 24 seahs, the best yield of all, because it was made from old produce. (In all cases this is "fine flour"; I don't know how this compares to yields for ordinary household use where you can be less picky.) (76b)

The torah describes several different ways of preparing the meal-offering, all of which are valid. But you have to stick to what you said you'd do: the mishna teaches that if a man said "I take upon myself to bring a meal-offering prepared on the griddle" he can't bring one prepared in a pan or vice-versa. What's the difference between a griddle and a pan? R' Yose the Galilean says the pan has a lid and the griddle does not. R' Chanina b. Gamaliel says the pan is deep and what is prepared in it is spongy, while a griddle is flat and what is prepared on it is hard. And if a man said "I take upon myself to bring a meal-offering baked in an oven" he must not bring what is baked in a stove or on tiles or in the fireplaces of the Arabs. R' Yehudah says a stove is ok. According to notes in the Soncino edition, a stove is a small oven that can hold only one pot, and the fireplace of the Arabs is an improvised fireplace, a cavity in the ground laid with clay. (63a)

Today's daf is 62.

Today's daf bit is a seasonal diversion into tractate Sukkah. During the week-long festival we are commanded to "dwell" in sukkot (booths), which the rabbis understand to mean eating and sleeping. But we learn in a mishna (Sukkah 25a) that casual eating is permitted outside the sukkah. What is casual eating? In the g'mara (26a) R' Yosef says the volume of two or three eggs, but Abaye says this sometimes suffices for a whole meal! Rather, Abaye says, it's only as much as a student eats before proceeding to the college assembly (a small breakfast, it sounds like). The g'mara continues: casual eating is permitted outside the sukkah, but not casual sleeping (a nap). Why not? Because you might sleep soundly and it turns out to be a real sleep, which you were required to do in the sukkah. Rami b. Ezekiel says a casual sleep means the time it takes to walk one hundred cubits.

Today's daf is Menachot 48.

In a discussion of the proper placement of the mezuzah, the scroll we place on the doorposts of our houses, the g'mara asks the following question: the torah says "you shall write these words on the doorposts of your house" -- doesn't this mean we should write them directly on the stones of the house? Where does the scroll come from? The g'mara answers that in other places that talk about writing it is onto a scroll or parchment -- a bill of divorce, the sotah's cursed water, and the torah scroll written by a king. On the other hand, the torah also says "write" when talking about the memorial stones that the Israelites will erect (containing the torah text) when they enter the land, and that's stone, so maybe we do write on our houses. No, the g'mara continues, we infer the meaning of "writing" from writing that was intended for all time, not for writing that was in its time only -- the laws of divorce, sotah, and torah scrolls remain, but the stones were for that generation only. But wait, another rabbi says -- you're talking about stones, but the torah says write them on your doorposts; how do we know it doesn't mean literally writing on the doorposts? Because when the torah says "and you shall write them" it means a perfect writing (there's some linguistic manipulation going on here), and any writing on stones or wood would be imperfect. Only a scroll can enable perfect writing. (34a)

If you take a close look at a torah scroll or mezuzah -- or any inked calligraphy on vellum or parchment -- you will see that the ink is actually sitting mainly on top of the surface, unlike with paper -- or wood -- where some of it is absorbed. Finished wood of the right type might not behave that way, but that's probably not what people use to make doorposts. I know more about writing than about wood, so I can't carry this analysis much farther.

A note in the Soncino edition of the talmud explains the procedure for a meal-offering: first some oil was poured in a vessel and then some fine flour was put in; then more oil was poured in and it was mingled with the flour. Then it was baked into cakes and broken in pieces. The remainder of the oil was poured on it, and the handful was taken from there. That's the baseline. The mishna now talks about deviations: if he didn't pour in the oil (at the end), or he didn't mingle it, or he didn't break the whole cake into pieces, or he didn't salt it, or he didn't wave it or bring it to the horn of the altar, or broke it into pieces that are too large or too small, or he didn't annoint it with oil when he needed to -- for any of these deviations, it is nonetheless a valid offering. (18a)

(Today's daf is 20.)

The mishna says: before the mishkan (tabernacle) was set up, bamot ("high places", other altars) were permitted and the service was performed by the firstborn. After the mishkan was set up, bamot were forbidden and the service was performed by the kohanim (priests). When the mishkan was in Gilgal during the conquest of the land, bamot were again permitted. When they came to Shiloh there was a stone building and bamot were again forbidden. When the miskhan was set up in Nov and then Giv'on, bamot were again permitted. And when the Beit Hamikdash, the Temple, was built in Jerusalem, bamot were forbidden forever, even after the Temple was destroyed. (112b)

The mishna gives us a history lesson, not reasons. I didn't see reasons for some of these (Nov and Giv'on in particular) in a quick scan of six pages of g'mara, but it was only a quick scan.

Today's daf is 111.

Tisha b'Av, commemorating the destruction of the temple, is this weekend. (Shabbat is the actual date, but we don't mourn on Shabbat so the fast and other observances are pushed off to Sunday.) The talmud in tractate Gittin is relevant, so today we'll cover that instead of the usual daf.

The g'mara starting on 55b says that the destruction of Jerusalem came through a Kamtza and a Bar Kamtza. How so? A certain man had a friend Kamtza and an enemy Bar Kamtza. He made a party and told his servant to bring Kamtza, but instead the servant brought Bar Kamtza. When the man saw his enemy he said "what are you doing here? Get out!" Bar Kamtza replied, "since I am here, let me stay and I'll pay for whatever I eat and drink", but the man said no. "Then let me give you half the cost of the party" -- no. "Then let me pay for the whole party" -- and still the man said no, and took him by the hand and put him out. Bar Kamtza then reasoned: the rabbis were there as guests and saw all this but did not stop him, so they must agree with him. I will go and inform against them.

So he went and said to the emperor: the Jews are rebelling against you. "How can I tell?" the emperor asked. Bar Kamtza said: send them an offering and see if they will offer it on the altar. So the emperor sent a fine calf, but on the way Bar Kamtza made a small blemish on it so it would not be an acceptable offering under Jewish law. The rabbis were inclined to offer it anyway to avoid giving offense, but R. Zechariah b. Abkulas said this could mislead Jews about proper offerings. They then proposed killing Bar Kamtza so he couldn't inform against them, but R. Zechariah asked: is making a blemish a capital offense? R' Yochanan then said: through the scruplulousness of R' Zechariah our House has been destroyed, our Temple burnt, and we have been exiled from our land. (55b-56a)

The rabbis say that the second temple (the one being talked about here) was destroyed because of sinat chinam, baseless hatred within Yisrael. This episode with Bar Kamtza illustrates the problem; it's not that the temple was destroyed because of this specific incident, but that this behavior was considered normal and acceptable -- none of the witnesses acted. If we can't treat each other decently, maybe we don't deserve the temple and the land.

(Today's daf is Zevachim 97.)

The current chapter of this tractate is talking about cases where offerings get mixed up, so the kohanim (priests) don't know which one was for which purpose. How you handle it depends on what was mixed up. The mishna here talks about a guilt-offering being mixed up with a peace-offering, and says that they are both handled in accordance with the more stringent law. In particular, while you have two days to eat a peace-offering, if they get mixed up like this then you have only the one day that you would have for a guilt-offering, and only the kohanim can eat it. Also, guilt-offerings have to be slaughtered in a particular place (the north side of the altar) but peace-offerings are more flexible; if they get mixed up then they both have to be slaughtered in the place for guilt-offerings. (75b)

The reason -- or at least a reason -- this matters is that once you designate something for a specific holy purpose, you can't change it. (This is true of offerings, tithes, donations, ritual objects...) So one of those animals was designated as a peace-offering and one was designated as a guilt-offering, and you can't just say "whichever one we treat as the guilt-offering is it". Therefore, they treat both in a way that complies with the stricter rules. Fortunately the rules are not in conflict; one is a proper subset of the other.

I don't know who pays for the loss if the person bringing it had other plans for that peace-offering, which he probably did.

Today's daf is 76.

Different offerings have different rules for how they are offered and eaten. The olah, or burnt offering, is wholly consumed and so nobody eats any of it. At the end of yesterday's daf the mishna says the communal peace-offering and the guilt-offerings must be slaughtered in a particular place within the temple (the north) and are eaten within the temple, by male priests, a day and a night until midnight. On today's daf the mishna says that the thanksgiving offering and the ram that the nazarite brings are of lesser sanctity; they are slaughtered anywhere within the temple court, and they are eaten in any part of the city, by any person, the same day and night until midnight (except for the parts that are given to the priests). The peace-offering is also of lesser sanctity; it is slaughtered anywhere within the temple court, and it is eaten anywhere in the city by anybody for two days and one night. All of these may be prepared in any manner, in contrast to the Pesach offering (coming up in a couple pages) which must be roasted. (54b-55a)

The thanksgiving and peace offerings are unscheduled and more "donor-driven" than the set communal offerings (times specified in torah) and guilt-offerings (owed when you transgress). I have the impression that the thanksgiving and peace offerings were things you planned a family feast around, so it makes sense that you can eat them anywhere in Jerusalem with anybody you like. I don't yet know why you get an extra day for the peace-offering.

Tractate Zevachim talks in great detail about the various offerings brought on the altar. The g'mara is currently discussing the offerings brought for unintentional transgressions of negative commandments (the torah says not to do X and you accidentally do X). Vayikra (Leviticus) chapter 4 describes the procedure for three special cases: if the high priest sins, if the whole community sins, and if a king sins. These three offerings are similar but not identical, and today's g'mara is talking about those differences.

The school of R' Yishmael taught: why does the torah mention burning the lobe and the two kidneys in the case of the priest's bull, but not in the case of the community's bull? This may be compared to a king of flesh and blood who was angry with his friend but spoke little of his offense out of love for him. And what does that mean? According to a note in the Soncino edition, the torah treats the community's offense more briefly rather than dwelling on these details. And the school of R' Yishmael also taught: why is sprinkling the blood before the curtain of the sanctuary mentioned for the priest's bull, but for the community's bull it just says the curtain (no sanctuary)? They give a different reason than brevity -- this can be compared to a king of flesh and blood when one of his provinces sinned against him: if a majority offended then the king withdraws his retainers from them, and in the same way when the whole community of Israel sins God withdraws His presence from them -- and thus there is no sanctuary, just a curtain. (41b)

We learn at the beginning of the third chapter of this tractate, in the mishna, that if an anointed high priest or a king committed a sin and then relinquished his position, the high priest brings a bull as a sin-offering and the king brings a goat -- these are bigger offerings than would be required of laymen. If they relinquished their positions before committing the sin, however, the outcome is different: the high priest still brings a bull but the king brings the offering of a layman. And if they committed their sins before gaining these positions, they are regarded as laymen for purposes of their sin-offerings, even if when they bring them they have the higher positions. (9b-10a)

The g'mara brings proof-texts to support the different rules for former high priests and former rulers, but I don't understand how they're getting this answer from those sources (Lev 4:3 and Lev 4:22).

Today's daf is 12.

As we near the end of this tractate, the discussion turns to cooking utensils that belonged to idolaters. The rabbis taught: if an Israelite buys utensils from an idolater, unused items are immersed in the mikvah and are then fit for use. Those that were used for cold items only are rinsed and immersed and are then fit. But for items that were used for hot foods it's more complicated. Kettles, heating vessels, and the like must be scalded; utensils used with fire (like spits) must be made white-hot; either way they must then be immersed and are then fit. (75b)

These are also the methods to kasher an item that has been made non-kosher (like if you accidentally use a meat utensil for dairy). Some things can't be kashered, like wooden spoons (too absorbent), and I assume we therefore can't get them used from idolaters at least if they've been used for hot foods. For cold, I don't know.

Today's daf is 73.

We have previously learned that wine touched by heathens cannot be drunk by Jews, because of concerns about their use of wine in idolatrous practices. (There is an exception, in common use today, for wine that has been boiled, because that makes it unfit for idolatry.) The g'mara now tells a story: R' Yochanan b. Arza and R' Yose b. Nehorai were once sitting and drinking wine (from an opaque jug, it seems). A man entered and they said to him "come, pour out for us". After he had poured it in their glass, they learned that he was a heathen. One of them prohibited it for any purpose, and the other permitted it even for drinking. R' Yehoshua b. Levi said: they're both right! He who prohibited it reasoned thus: the heathen must have said to himself, "would it occur to rabbis such as these to drink beer? Surely it is wine!" and he then rendered it unfit. He who permitted it reasoned thus: the heathen must have said to himself, "would it occur to rabbis such as these to have me pour wine for them? It must be beer!" and he did not render it unfit. In this latter case, pouring wine was an unintentional action and we do not decree against unintentional actions. (58a-b)

The g'mara does not discuss the rabbis' own role in the incident (they told the man to pour), or whether it makes a difference if he did it on his own or was following instructions (maybe making him their agent).

Nor does it discuss the presumption that the heathen would know the halacha about restrictions with wine. In fact, the issue of heathens' (lack of) knowledge was an issue in an earlier discussion about kashrut. Remember that the talmud compiles the words of many individual rabbis, so "the talmud says X" and "the talmud says not X" does not mean the talmud is inconsistent. It can mean that two opinions differ (and you need to look up the final halacha if it matters to you), or that the situations were different in some important way. The talmud records all views; it doesn't speak with one voice.

(Today's daf is 59.)